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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I discuss and compare the (im)possibility of thinking that which 
is most worth our thought in Deleuze’s What Is Philosophy? (1994) and 
Heidegger’s course lectures in What Is Called Thinking? (2004). Both authors 
criticize the history of philosophy in similar ways in order to reconsider what 
should be taken as the nature and task of philosophical thinking. For 
Deleuze, true thinking is the creation of concepts, but what is most worth our 
thought in fact cannot be thought. For Heidegger, Being calls on us think, 
and to think rightly is to be underway toward thinking itself, a grateful 
heeding of Being. In this paper I explore the very possibility to think that 
which is most worth our thought. I will argue that although for both authors 
proper thinking as such is possible, thinking what is most worth our thought 
seems remarkably both possible as impossible. 
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1. Introduction: Do You Think We Can Think? 
 
Do you think we can think? There seems already a paradox 
involved in the very phrasing of such a sentence. The line of 
reasoning that brings us to conceive of this apparent conflict is 
one that belongs to the heritage of Descartes; for how can one 
question or doubt that one can think without still being 
involved in thinking? Despite its contradictory appearance, it is 
this question that will be our central concern in what follows. 
The very nature of philosophical thinking itself, its true 
domain, limits and aims, is radically reconsidered and 
redefined in Heidegger’s later thinking. In the interview in Der 
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Spiegel1, Heidegger considered What Is Called Thinking? as one 
of his least read books but nevertheless as one that addresses 
the most fundamental of all philosophical questions. On the 
French front, it was most notably Deleuze who drew attention 
to the very same question, via a reconsideration of what we 
have traditionally taken to be philosophical thinking. 
With regard to the question ‘what is philosophy?’ in 
Deleuze, we should be careful to discern, as with Heidegger, 
that which has been called philosophy and that which should be 
regarded as good philosophy. Difference and Repetition (1994) 
deals to the largest extent with the representational image of 
thought of traditional philosophy and expands on four ‘iron 
collars’ of representation and eight postulates of traditional 
philosophy which accord with this classic image of thinking. In 
What Is Philosophy?, by contrast, the ‘image of thought’ has 
become more or less synonymous to the notion of ‘plane of 
immanence’ and now concerns the true nature of all proper 
philosophical thinking. The four philosophical illusions, which 
tied us to representational thinking, in Difference and 
Repetition (1994), can be regarded – in a parallel fashion to 
Heidegger’s metaphysics of presence – as Deleuze’s starting 
point for arriving at a novel understanding of what it means to 
philosophize. For Deleuze, genuine thinking requires a re-
installment of an original difference and repetition, both of 
which cannot be thought in themselves as long as they remain 
subjected to the image of representation. General similarities 
between both authors can be said to stretch a long way. 
Heidegger and Deleuze are critical in comparable ways of 
propositional logic, dialectics and representationalism or 
metaphysics of presence. However, their conceptions of what 
constitutes true and good thinking can be argued to differ 
strongly. For Deleuze, problems are true, and good philosophy 
is knowledge through the inventing and thinking of concepts, 
which first requires the installing of an immanent plane. 
Philosophy, and philosophy alone, has an often misunderstood 
vocation for the creation of such true concepts, the truth of 
which can only be assessed relative to the respective plane. 
In What Is Called Thinking? (2004), Heidegger focuses 
more than before on language as that from which Being calls us 
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into thinking. Language is not the sum of all words and neither 
is it something like a tool we use; it is rather something 
originary that speaks itself through us. Language is taken to 
play a highly determinative role in the different ways in which 
Being calls on us to think. By considering language as an 
originary speaking it allows Heidegger to dig into specific words 
of which we have forgotten what they once spoke. 
Consequently, we can move through language – especially the 
German2 – like the ‘billowing waters of an ocean’ and retrieve a 
particular call to think, one which is perhaps more hidden from 
us now than ever before. For nowadays, everyone can speak 
with our language; we all have opinions, knowledge of facts, 
have questions and answers and we can all more or less reason 
logically. But does this mean that we can all think? To the 
contrary: precisely this modern way of thinking constitutes our 
forgetfulness of thought itself, thus preventing us from 
thinking, and in a way, that is what is most worth our thought 
today: the fact that we do not yet think. But our question 
remains: can we think at all? 
 
2. Heidegger and the Call for Thinking 
 
For Heidegger in What Is Called Thinking?, the primary way to 
move toward a new understanding of thinking is by turning 
back towards our past. To consider the title question requires 
already that we distinguish several sub-questions. Firstly, we 
need to ask what the words thinking and thought signify, and 
secondly, what meaning we have usually given to them 
throughout our philosophical tradition. Thirdly, we may ask 
how we can think rightly, a question considered almost 
unanswerable, and lastly and most importantly, what it is that 
calls on us to think. For Heidegger, the fourth question has a 
certain priority over the others. Perhaps this primacy comes 
from the fact that it concerns the very nature and origin of 
thought itself, namely that from which it originally comes to us. 
The difficulty, however, is to find a more or less unbiased point 
of departure from which we can start our contemplations. With 
respect to this, a great deal of Heidegger’s fascination goes to 
the pre-socratic philosophers, the thoughts of which he takes as 
Corijn van Mazijk / Mission Impossible? Thinking What Must be Thought 
 
 
339 
 
being yet unspoiled by the western philosophical tradition. It is 
here, then, that we may look for clues that bring a more 
original understanding of what it means to think closer into 
view. For Heidegger, one way to start such investigations is to 
take language for what it is. Precisely the ‘floundering in 
commonness’ with regard to our contemporary use of language 
makes Heidegger refer to it as a ‘high and dangerous game’ in 
which we ourselves are the stakes (Heidegger 2004, 119). It is 
the peculiar nature of language – which speaks through us 
rather than being a humanly controlled tool – which allows for 
a sort of retrieval of forgotten meanings. By means of a kind of 
philosophical etymology, Heidegger aims to retrieve what the 
word ‘thinking’ originally spoke before it got its permanent 
logical stamp through which we are still destined to consider it 
today. We will see that, if we are thus enabled to near a 
thinking about thinking in the fourth way, this would prove 
already to be a true thinking that is underway.  
The old English ‘thencan’, to think, in its relation to 
‘thancian’, to thank, constitutes one of the windows opened by 
Heidegger through which we may peek into a more original 
understanding of what is called thinking. The German word for 
memory, Gedächtnis, also stems from thanc, and it still carries 
a connotation to thinking and similarly a clear relation to 
thanking (danken) in it. These relations have been forgotten 
today but were essential to our pre-logical understanding of 
thinking. According to Heidegger, memory, in its original sense, 
is not just a thinking or recalling of past events as we are used 
to taking it. Moreover, it is a thinking and at the same time a 
thanking of past, future and now, a meditative state of heeding 
that which is gathered and compressed in the living present. 
Memory, in this respect, is essentially a keeping safe. This 
keeping is, for Heidegger, not a human capacity; it is rather 
something that happens. Memory is a keeping which we as 
humans inhabit. As Heidegger emphasizes: ‘Keeping alone […] 
gives what is to-be-thought, […], it frees it as a gift’ (Heidegger 
2004, 151). 
Consequently, the word thinking does not merely denote 
a thinking in its ordinary sense of reason and logic; it is said to 
have a close affinity to thanking and to memory as well. These 
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activities taken together constitute an original thinking that is 
a keeping safe and gratefully heeding of a gift. This stands in 
need of some further clarification. For one: what is kept in such 
a thankful keeping safe? For Heidegger, it is the presence itself, 
Being, which is heeded and most worth our thought - not as the 
presence of things but as a play of concealment and 
unconcealment. It is from the presence of that which is present 
that there speaks an essential duality of Being and beings, of a 
presence and what is given as present. This duality is already 
elaborated on in much earlier works by Heidegger such as Vom 
Wesen des Grundes (1928), where it is referred to as the 
‘ontological difference’ standing at the heart of the 
transcendence of Dasein. This duality or difference continues to 
play a crucial role in Heidegger’s late thinking. An essential 
difference with this earlier work, however, is that in What Is 
Called Thinking? (2004) the human being does not execute this 
transcendence; it only keeps it. 
The difference between presence and that which is 
present – between Being and beings - is at the very essence of 
thinking; it is that which first allows for thought and also that 
which calls us into it. Heidegger’s discussions on how exactly 
this presence comes into view phenomenologically speaking and 
how we are to understand this are in my opinion somewhat 
unsatisfactory. I think that Husserl (1997) does offer satisfying 
analyses of similar intentional processes in discussing the 
origin of the constitution of the categorial objectivity (Husserl 
1997, 217-313). For some reason, this connection is not made 
very often in secondary literature. Although Husserl’s writings 
are highly complicated in their own ways, I believe that a short 
excursion to one of them will prove fruitful. I will try to briefly 
interpret Husserl’s analyses in Experience and Judgment 
(1997) in the light of Heidegger’s ontological difference in order 
to clarify the latter. For this, I will focus on the ‘empty 
judgment’ and the ‘judgment of existentiality’ which play 
important roles in Husserl’s investigations. The empty 
judgment is a judgment which is not intuitively actualized in 
external perception at the moment of judging, something which 
is possible through the sedimentation of such originally 
intended judgments which are then retentionally retained 
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while losing their connection to the originary, actual fulfillment 
in perception. In other words, the empty judgment allows for a 
peculiar temporal distance within consciousness through which 
the judgment is seperated from the immediate perceptual 
givenness of the about-which of the judgment. The empty 
judgment can again find its original fulfillment, making the 
intention and the actual givenness match again, and if the ego 
actively runs over this passive process of matching, the 
judgment-content gets apprehended in a fundamentally 
different way then before. Husserl call this process 
‘substantivation’, by which he means that a judgment such as ‘P 
is s and q’ which originally required multiple rays of attention 
(from P to s, then to q and back) can now be grasped in a single 
ray, namely as something like ‘the fact that, S is p and q’. For 
Husserl, this is an intellectual achievement and therefore he 
calls this new, single object - namely this single ‘fact that’ - an 
‘objectivity of the understanding’ or a ‘categorial objectivity’.3 
This process of constituting categorial objectivities here 
described in extreme simplicity is one in which consciousness 
apprehends an object which is not itself receptively given; it 
constitutes an ideal object. Furthermore, it is this process in 
which there is necessarily instituted a peculiar difference which 
is needed for the experience of truth and the judgment of 
existentiality (being). For Husserl, truth is the active 
experience of a peculiar synthesis of coincidence or fulfillment 
(Bernet 2003): the match described earlier between an 
anticipatory intention (of an empty judgment) and its actual 
fulfillment in experience. Hence, the experience of truth 
requires this difference, and because of this difference there is a 
possibility of doubt intrinsic to all judgments of truth or 
existentiality. For there will always be the need again and 
again to reassertain that the intended sense really corresponds 
to the actual experience, due to the fact that empty judgments 
have lost their connection to the original evidence. The 
important point for us to consider is that it is precisely here at 
the active synthesis of fulfillment lying at the heart of truth 
and the categorial object that we find the institution of a unique 
difference in consciousness between the intended sense and the 
identical object corresponding to this in experience. In the case 
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of a successful synthesis, we predicate the ‘being’ of the sense to 
the actually given object in perception. Here, consciousness 
thus transcends the objects immediately given and institutes an 
intellectual difference between the being of an object and the 
being it is. 
Now let us return to our question as to what is kept in 
the thankful keeping safe which Heidegger has called thinking. 
We already noted that this kind of thinking has its connections 
to memory, which in turn should be viewed as a keeping safe - 
not only of something that has already past, but of everything 
which has gathered itself before us in the living present. We 
also noted that what we keep safe is the presence of the 
presented, the Being of beings, and that we as human beings 
only inhabit this keeping. Such a keeping is a heeding of Being; 
it allows Being to stand open. Consequently, we should note 
that thinking and Being, in this respect, really are two sides of 
the very same coin. For Being means presence and thinking 
keeps this presence of the presented and thereby frees it as a 
gift. As such, this duality or difference of beings in Being is also 
that which is most worth our thought, namely by heedfully 
keeping safe that which is gathered before us at any time: 
beings in Being (Heidegger 1961, 156). It is thus this duality 
itself which as a gift is most worthy of heedful keeping; it is 
what gives us ‘food for thought’. By taking a halt, paying heed 
and keeping close to heart that which lies gathered before us at 
any time, we may allow the presence to be freed as a gift. What 
is thus most thought-provoking is the memory as a keeping, 
something by which we first allow the call to think to become 
manifest. This is how we are called into thinking. It is 
interesting to note that Heidegger’s ideas stand in close affinity 
to Husserl’s analyses. For Husserl, the judgment of 
existentiality, of predicating being, is an activity of the 
spontaneous understanding in which this being is produced. In 
other words, the ideal object which consciousness apprehends is 
nothing but the activity of synthesis itself (Husserl 1997, 207); 
here too, the being is the thinking. 
Clearly, what we thus think by way of heedfully 
thanking is not a that in the sense we are today used to 
conceptualize thinking. To think is not to consider a problem 
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and to attempt to find answers to it. There are no answers to be 
attained in genuine thought; one does not reach a point at 
which one has grasped that which is most worth thinking. 
Rather, it is precisely our common disposition to use thinking in 
this ontic sense which is worth our thought now; the fact that 
we expect of thinking that it would yield such results. Hence, 
that we are today not yet thinking and are perhaps at the 
greatest distance ever from it, is most worth our thought. 
It is this last phrase, ‘that we do not yet think’, which 
allows us to distinguish a two-folded structure at the roots of 
what calls us into thinking. Firstly, that we are not yet 
thinking means that we are called for thinking now because 
less than ever do we think in the right manner. This means 
that it is worth to think because we do not think. In a second 
sense, we are always called to think, for that which calls on us 
is the fact of Being of which we always already must have an 
understanding. Ultimately, what gives food for thought in this 
latter sense is thinking itself. What is worth thinking is the fact 
that things are and that we think them: precisely that we think 
is worth thinking. In other words, the thinking that comes from 
Being is itself what is worth to be thought; thinking is what is 
worth thinking. Although Grey says in the introduction to the 
translation of What is Called Thinking (2004) that Heidegger is 
‘persuaded that man is naturally inclined to thinking’ 
(Heidegger 2004, xv), this phrasing is perhaps misleading. An 
inclination or affinity between thinking and Being makes it 
sound as if Heidegger needs such an affinity as a subjective 
presupposition. But the togetherness of thinking and Being is 
not presupposed; they are, to Heidegger, essentially one. 
Surely, it is not so that when we speak of Being we immediately 
intend to say thinking. But the meaning of thinking Heidegger 
is after is ultimately so tied to Being that both are inseparable. 
If we now compare our two senses of thinking just 
distinguished, what is worth thinking is precisely and 
simultaneously that we think and that we do not think. 
This does not constitute a satisfactory answer to our 
question yet: can we think what is most worth our thought at 
all? It is already admitted by Heidegger that the involvement 
with thought is rare, meant for a small number of people only. 
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On top of that, whether we are capable to think at all depends 
on whether we can let ourselves become involved in the call 
(Heidegger 2004, 126). But hereby not much is said, since 
thinking in fact is the being involved in the very question of 
thinking. To think is to be involved with it and as such to be on 
the way toward it. For Heidegger, then, true thinking is never 
to ‘think the thought’, that is, it is never to attain the 
thoughtful by thinking; rather it is only in movement toward it, 
and this being toward is precisely and already to think. The 
situation might remain vague unless we supply thinking with 
multiple meanings. In one sense, one never can think what is 
worth thinking, as if it concerned a thematic holding in grasp of 
the thoughtful, a that. But in quite another way, one can 
properly think what is worth our thought, namely by being 
underway toward thinking, a grateful heeding of Being. In this 
latter sense, it is not at all the difficulty of thinking which 
stands in our way, but rather its simplicity: to think is simply 
to let lie before you, and take to the heart, beings in Being. 
So how are we to understand the very possibility to 
think that which is most worth our thought? There seem to be 
several sides to this that concern us. What should strike us 
above all is the self-sufficiency of our reading of Heidegger. 
Given the close ‘affinity’ between, or better, the essential unity, 
of thought and Being, we can say that the fact that we think is 
itself worth thinking. Consequently, thinking and that which is 
to be thought come together in an apparently formal tautology. 
In thought, nothing in fact gives itself but itself. This tautology 
is quite clearly phrased by Heidegger: ‘the keeping itself is the 
most thought-provoking thing, [which] itself is its mode of 
giving’ (Heidegger 2004, 151 italics added). There is no 
essential difference between what is kept and what is given, 
between the thinking and that which is thought. In this sense, 
there seems to be a remarkable emptiness in thought, and 
neither is any-thing to be gained by its practice. Is the mere 
listening to the call, itself an empty giving, itself thinking? Does 
thinking become the mere attempt at an empty reflection on 
what is given to us? If the nature of thinking is indeed a formal 
apprehension, could it allow for more to be given than mere 
intentionality itself?4 It should be clear, at any rate, that 
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thought for Heidegger cannot be said to move forward in 
whatever way; it is rather circular. In line with this, Heidegger 
responds that in following the call from Being, we are 
admittedly never freed from what is asked of us; we can only 
respond to it by remaining underway (Heidegger 1961, 12). 
Can these apparent difficulties which seem to make 
thinking collapse into itself harm Heidegger’s true intentions? I 
think that it could at least be argued that the structure of 
thinking here considered, much like Heidegger’s understanding 
of truth as concealment and unconcealment, is so broad and all-
encompassing that it is threatened by unclarity5 and even by a 
vicious circularity. Similarly, it risks losing all bonds with the 
meaning we commonly ascribe to thinking. On the other hand, 
one might argue that we risk mistaking Heidegger’s aims by 
reducing them to the logical structures of the argument. If we 
follow Samuel IJsseling’s (2007) reading, we reach a different 
understanding, one in which thinking means that the grateful 
human being thinks and rethinks what is given to him, is 
thankful for this, and thereby participates in and completes the 
event of Being (IJsseling and Sevenant 2007, 41-43). 
Ultimately, according to this reading, to think is simply to be 
thankful; to gratefully rethink what has gathered itself before 
us. It is Being which deserves our gratitude and which we are 
called upon to keep safe. 
 
3. Deleuze and the Plane of Immanence 
 
Although Deleuze’s writing style is a world apart from 
Heidegger’s, to interpret the first in its relation to the latter 
seems almost inevitable. Deleuze’s attacks on 
representationalism do not take the Heideggerean form of a 
metaphysics of presence; neither do they make use of Being, the 
ontological difference or Heidegger’s truth notion. Whereas 
much of Heidegger’s terminology can be grasped and 
understood by practicing phenomenology, much of Deleuze’s 
vocabulary may make a metaphorical impression upon the 
reader. Nevertheless, his approach is perhaps more systematic 
than that of the later Heidegger. For Deleuze, four ‘iron collars’ 
guide traditional representational thinking and eight 
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postulates are said to constitute the dogmatic image of thought 
of which representation forms a part.6 It is said that we have 
been alienated from what it really means to think by the 
traditional image of thought, in its turn guided by the Same 
and the Similar, which resulted in a subordination of the true 
powers of an imageless thought: difference and repetition. 
For Deleuze, good thinking is a two-sided constructivist's 
task; the creation of concepts and the institution of a plane of 
immanence. Although both are strongly related and 
intertwined, they are also strictly separate. According to 
Deleuze, the history of philosophy consists in a certain way of 
the institution of new immanent planes. In traditional 
philosophy, perhaps with the exception of Spinoza,7 immanence 
got tied up to various forms of transcendence. An example of 
this would be Husserl’s absolute consciousness and immanent 
essences thereof, a model which maintains a relation of 
immanence to the subjective transcendent correlate of the ego. 
When the immanent plane is derived from or located in beings, 
one risks binding the autonomous immanent field to 
transcendent objects. There are striking similarities between 
Deleuze’s account of this relation between transcendence and 
immanence and Heidegger’s metaphysics of presence or onto-
theology (Heidegger 2009). In both cases, there is an 
absolutization of something to a permanent presence whereby 
sameness is prioritized over difference. For Deleuze, each good 
philosopher of the past has instituted its own plane and many 
of these were made dependent on transcendence. In fact, 
Deleuze argues that it is impossible to think and create 
immanence that is not dependent on transcendence. The plane 
is like a ‘section of chaos’, a chaos which is even more original 
and fundamental than the plane. Ultimately, the choice will 
always be between a transcendence which can structure the 
chaos and the chaos itself Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 51). 
Here, then, both authors do have a disagreement; for whereas 
Deleuze sets metaphysics at the heart of good philosophy, 
Heidegger in his later life argues that philosophy as a whole 
has come to an end (Heidegger 1966). 
In every single case of instituting a particular immanent 
plane this allows for the creation of certain concepts that could 
Corijn van Mazijk / Mission Impossible? Thinking What Must be Thought 
 
 
347 
 
not have risen on other planes. Hence it can be said that there 
are multiple immanent planes. On the other hand, however, 
Deleuze seems to opt for a distinction between a multiplicity of 
immanent planes throughout time and ‘the plane of immanence 
[which] is always single, being itself pure variation’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994, 39). At any rate, planes ‘change’ throughout 
time in whatever sense of the word; the image of thought of 
Plato is not the same as that of Descartes. That we ought to 
distinguish between the plane of immanence and concepts 
respectively becomes clear when the plane is characterized as 
the framework of thought itself, which means that it itself 
cannot be a concept (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 34).  
In order to understand whether we can think that which 
is most worth to be thought according to Deleuze, we will 
distinguish between two different uses of the term plane of 
immanence – even though Deleuze does not explicitly separate 
them. On the one hand, when we talk retrospectively of the 
various planes of past philosophers, we are conceptualizing 
these different frameworks of thinking and thereby we consider 
their multiplicity. As we have seen, we can speak of such planes 
as being ‘’tied to transcendence’’. On the other hand, we can 
also speak of the plane absolutely, that which is always the 
unthinkable framework of thought which we should conceive of 
as being independent from any transcendental determination. 
The plane is itself infinite, unthinkable and formal; a ‘One-All’ 
principle (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 35, 39). It may appear as 
if the plane of immanence would be nothing but a formal 
abstraction. For Deleuze, however, the answer seems to be no: 
immanence is not an abstraction from transcendent experience 
but rather something original. It is not, as in Husserl, a flux 
related to a transcendent subject; it is rather a neutral, a-
subjective field, presenting only events and allowing for 
concepts and worlds to be created. 
Although the plane of immanence is pre-philosophical, it 
has to be 'instituted' by the philosopher. Thinking, for Deleuze, 
requires a plane to start from. We have already seen that 
philosophy is dependent on the institution of a plane, for it can 
only become philosophy by giving structure to chaos. 
Philosophy, in this respect, should acquire consistency without 
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losing difference and chaos out of sight (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994, 42). At the birth of any plane, however, stands not just 
chaos, but also something which the author often refers to as 
‘stupidity’ [bêtise] (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 35, 39). To 
ground something, as Deleuze says, is to 'determine the 
indeterminate'. Determination does not just happen, but rises 
out of an empty ground, a faceless existence which is called a 
groundlessness. This groundlessness is something peculiarly 
intrinsic to thought, even though it often goes unrecognized.8 
Stupidity, in this respect, is a specifically human trait, intrinsic 
to thinking and to any instituted plane. It is the greatest 
weakness of thought and simultaneously its highest power. 
How do we understand stupidity as the highest principle 
of thought while at the same time being the groundlessness of 
it? Czech phenomenologist Patočka discusses the relations 
between meaning, significance and meaninglessness which may 
help us grasp the essence of Deleuze’s paradoxical phrasing. 
According to Patočka, the Fregean distinction between meaning 
and significance supports a classic metaphysical dichotomy, as 
they are understood to make reference possible to autonomous, 
objective qualities. If reality is understood as bearing such 
objective significances, whether inside or outside ‘reality’, then 
the meaningfulness of objects is ultimately guaranteed by these 
objective meanings. Consequently, a full loss of meaning is 
never truly uncovered, as the meaningfulness of reality is 
inherently given according to the particular rules which stand 
for determining significance. The history of philosophical 
metaphysics is for Patočka, as for Heidegger, bound to treating 
meaning as having objective value, which safeguards the 
meaningfulness of the world. However, meaninglessness as an 
experience is never completely alien to any philosopher, 
whether he reflects on it or not. Thinking, as it first rises in the 
Greek polis with Socrates (Patočka 1996, 62-63), is grounded in 
the experience of a ‘shakenness of meaning’ and all thinking is 
a way of dealing with and often an attempt to overcome the 
intrinsic possibility of a complete loss of meaning. The 
philosophical tradition is thus regarded by Patočka as ways of 
dealing with meaninglessness, which is characterized by 
Patočka as ‘care for the soul’.9 
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Patočka’s loyalty to Heidegger is more evident than 
Deleuze’s; it is only through our experience of meaninglessness 
– compare anxiety (Heidegger 2012, 225-228), boredom 
(Heidegger 1929, 5-6) or Abgrund,10 that we achieve an explicit 
relation to Being, by which genuine thought is first evoked. 
Care for the soul, in this respect, is the philosophical result of 
the unconcealment of Being which runs in a parallel fashion to 
Heidegger’s metaphysics of presence and in a different way to 
Deleuze’s representationalism.  
Understood from the viewpoint of Patočka’s 
meaninglessness, we can see firstly how stupidity can be the 
greatest weakness of thought. Thought rises from the 
experience of a nullification of meaning or ground, and has to 
take this as its starting point for all attempts to determine that 
which has already given itself as inherently indeterminable. As 
Deleuze says: ‘No image of thought can be limited to a selection 
of calm determinations, and all of them encounter something 
that is abominable in principle’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 
54). Consequently, it is clear that with regard to stupidity as 
weakness there can be said to be hardly any distance from 
Heidegger or Patočka. That stupidity is also thought’s highest 
power, is to say that it is prerequisite to thinking; it is what 
comes before it. Thought is thus grounded groundlessly: 
stupidity is its weakness as its groundlessness; it is its strength 
as its ground. Deleuze immediately follows up his discussion of 
stupidity with a quote from Heidegger: ‘what gives us most 
cause for thought is that we do not yet think’ (Deleuze 1994, 
275). We should, however, be careful to take this sentence here 
in its Heideggerean fashion. What this quote in fact says in this 
context is that stupidity as groundless ground for thinking is 
the ultimate cause for thought. ‘That we do not yet think’, this 
means here: thinking rises from an abyss of non-thinking. 
Before thought, we thought not. This is contrary to Heidegger, 
who as we have seen also saves the more literal sense of the 
sentence; that we, twentieth century-born human beings, have 
the task set to reconsider what it really means to think. 
To come back to my central concern again: the plane of 
immanence, as Deleuze himself calls it, is what must be 
thought but in fact cannot be thought (Deleuze and Guattari 
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1994, 59). It is the base of all possible planes, the pure and 
unthinkable immanence in every thinking. How again to 
understand these awkward phrasings? Husserl makes a 
distinction between inconceivability and unimaginability which 
may help us understand this. According to Husserl in Ideas I, 
formal or ideal concepts, which allow for mathematical 
precision or exact determination, are such that one cannot in 
fact 'see' them (Husserl 1983, 166). That is to say, their content 
is essentially different from the nature of things as experienced 
in simple, perceptual intuition, in that the latter allow for 
intuitive fulfillment in external perception whereas the former 
do not. Consequently, it is perfectly possible to conceive of, say, 
a color without extension, but one cannot imagine it, that is, 
intuitively fulfill such an intention in imaginative intuition 
(Soffer 1990). We could say that the plane of immanence in 
Deleuze's philosophy is idealized and non-intuitable. Certainly 
the plane of immanence is conceivable, but it cannot be fulfilled 
in intuition. This does not imply that Deleuze thinks it would 
be unreal. We can now understand why Deleuze calls it the 
unthinkable within thought, stating that it is the most intrinsic 
to it and at the same time the most extrinsic. It is never to be 
within the reach of thought, even though it is always inherent 
to it and most deserves our attention. Regardless of this, there 
still lies a single most important task for philosophers: to show 
that the plane is there, even though it is never to be thought. 
The philosopher should try to think that which most deserves 
its attention, thus showing the unthought within thought 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 59-60).  
 
4. Conclusion: What Must be Thought, What Cannot be 
Thought 
 
The interpretations I have given of Heidegger’s as well as 
Deleuze’s reconsiderations of thinking show the complex 
structure of both expositions. Both Heidegger and Deleuze 
naturally hold that thinking is possible, but neither wants to 
commit to a form of correspondence and hence their 
characterizations of thinking are bound to become difficult and 
unfamiliar. Heidegger’s break with tradition seems the most 
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radical; thinking does not learn or attain any-thing; it only 
keeps. Thinking is a keeping and heeding of the event of Being. 
By heeding, thinking helps to bring the event of Being to 
completion. The togetherness of Being and thinking in 
Heidegger is so strong that it appears an essential unity. 
However, the price for Heidegger’s radical break is quite high. 
What Tugendhat (1967) says about Heidegger’s extension of our 
traditional understanding of truth so as to make it so wide that 
it risks losing all of its traditional meaning, might equally apply 
to the notion of thinking here discussed. With respect to what is 
most worth our thought in Heidegger, I have argued for a two-
folded structure. Firstly, that our generation does not yet think 
and has the greatest difficulty to do it constitutes one side of 
what gives food for thought now. However, what at all times is 
worth our thought is the call for thinking itself, regardless of 
how it is manifest to us. We are called into thinking and to 
think about this is already to listen to it and thereby to pay it 
heed. Thought in this sense is not after knowledge which it can 
or cannot attain; it merely keeps safe beings in Being. We have 
seen that this exposition of thinking is threatened by 
circularity. Regardless of this, we may conclude that to think in 
this most important sense is an essential possibility for every 
human being rather than an impossibility. Thinking is a call 
from Being, and whoever is related in whatever way to Being –  
whoever is Dasein – has the essential possibility of proper 
thinking. 
With respect to What is Philosophy? (1994), I have 
shown that for Deleuze thinking primarily means to create and 
invent concepts and to institute a plane. Good thinking does 
justice to the original forces forgotten by the traditional image 
of thought, difference and repetition, which form the abyss 
around which thought is bound to circle. Clearly, thinking is an 
essential possibility for Deleuze as a creative process. What is 
most worth our attention is the plane of immanence, the 
unthought within thought which by definition cannot be 
thought. This unthought is not a senseless abstraction; it is 
rather intrinsic to the structure of thinking. 
I have already pointed out important agreements 
between both thinkers with regard to the classic picture of 
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thought, characterized by means of metaphysics of presence, 
representationalism, propositional logic and dialectics. It is only 
on the basis of these commonalities that both set off into 
different directions with regard to redefining the meaning of 
thinking. One important similarity we may now add to this list 
pertains to that which is most worth our thought in both 
philosophies. For Heidegger as for Deleuze, what is most worth 
our thought is essentially unthinkable; hence it is not that 
which is most worth our thought. In the final account, for 
Deleuze as for Heidegger, the philosopher’s task is not to think 
the impossible: rather it is to participate, to create, to 
accomplish, to keep and to heed. Thinking does not set out to let 
something out there enter it and to subsequently gain 
knowledge about that thing. Consequently, it is ultimately 
neither an intrinsic impossibility nor a tautology which we 
ought itself to think and to let enter our minds. No: the 
impossibility must not and cannot be attained directly; we 
should rather say that it should be circled around. By regarding 
thinking as an activity, we can now think how we can think 
what is most worth our thought even though to think it is 
impossible. For Deleuze, the most important task for any 
philosopher is the activity of showing that which is most worth 
our thought even though it cannot be thought. For Heidegger, 
what is most worth our thought is the activity of heedfully 
keeping that which lies before us. For both authors, then, 
despite all difficulties, that which is most worth our thought 
can indeed be thought in this sense: that we can actively 
participate in the problem of thinking. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 The interview bears the title ‘Only a God Can Save Us’ (Heidegger 1966). 
2 Heidegger conceived the Geman language to be the most suitable for doing 
philosophy due to its close affinity to the Greek language (Heidegger 1966, 
62). 
3 For the sake of simplicity I have here skipped many steps in this process of 
objectification, such as the constitution of the ‘state of affairs’ and the role of 
the ‘two-membered predicative synthesis’ – not to mention the passive 
syntheses also operative at the same time. For the core part here discussed 
see Husserl (1997, 237-239). 
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4 Derrida uses this phrasing in his introduction to Husserl’s Origin of 
Geometry (Derrida 1962, 139). 
5 Ernst Tugendhat argues this in the introduction to his dissertation 
(Tugendhat 1967, 4-5). 
6 I will not expand on the postulates of the image of thought here. For the 
briefest summary see Deleuze (1994, 167-168). 
7 Deleuze is known to refer to Spinoza as the ‘prince of philosophers’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 1994, 60).  
8 Among the eight postulates of the classic image of thought Deleuze posits 
the reduction of the trinity of stupidity, malevolence and madness to the 
single figure of external error. Error, in this respect, is only the failure of good 
sense within a framework of presupposed common sense, rather than being 
recognized as a necessary structure of thought (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 
150). 
9 Care for the soul is one of the main topic in many of Patočka’s works 
(Patočka 1996, 1998). 
10 For a brief introduction to Heidegger’s idea of Abgrund see Backman (2005,  
175-184).  
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